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Being earthbound: Arendt,
process and alienation
in the Anthropocene
Oliver Belcher and Jeremy J Schmidt
Durham University, UK
Abstract
Hannah Arendt developed a twofold account of ‘being earthbound’ directly relevant to
Anthropocene debates regarding the political. For Arendt, both senses of ‘being earthbound’
arose as humans began to act into nature, not merely upon it. The first sense is oriented to a
political ontology of process, which arose as human actions – political, technological, scientific –
nullified modernist conceits separating humans from nature. The second sense is one of earth
alienation, which is referenced specifically to a scientific praxis coincident with advances in sci-
ence and technology that alienates common sense experiences in politics. Though not unqual-
ified, these two senses of being earthbound anchor our argument that Arendt offered prescient
resources for understanding the political in the Anthropocene at the intersection of science,
capital and world. The article ends by contrasting Arendt’s account of being earthbound with
Bruno Latour’s recent interventions on the politics of Gaia.
Keywords
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Introduction
In May 2019, the Anthropocene Working Group (AWG) voted to treat the Anthropocene
as a ‘formal chrono-stratigraphic unit’ by a margin of 29 to 4. The same tally carried a
second vote to use ‘stratigraphic signals around the mid-twentieth century’ as the primary
marker for the ‘base of the Anthropocene’.1 For those following debates over human
impacts on the Earth system, the vote was unsurprising. In 2015, the AWG argued a
mid-20th century start date was optimal and identified the ‘artificial radioisotope’ signal
of atomic bombs as a potent stratigraphic signal of the Anthropocene (Zalasiewicz et al.,
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2015: 201). In 2016, the AWG recognized the stratigraphic and functional distinctiveness of
the Anthropocene, and presented evidence and recommendations to establish it as a geo-
logical time unit at the 35th International Geological Congress (Waters et al., 2016;
Zalasiewicz et al., 2017). Earth system scientists have long argued that the coincidence of
various geological signatures – fly ash, radionuclides, plastics, greenhouse gas concentra-
tions – with anthropogenic impacts has forced the Earth system into a ‘no-analogue’ state
(Steffen et al., 2004). For social scientists, this no-analogue state is pregnant with political
implications as signs referencing industrialism, colonialism, Indigenous genocide, plantation
slavery, nuclear energy and capitalism each articulate differently – if often relatedly – with
the unequal social conditions driving planetary forcing (Davis and Todd, 2017; Haraway,
2016; Lewis and Maslin, 2018; Moore, 2015; Yusoff, 2017, 2019). In this context, the votes
cast by AWGmembers not only entangle science with politics, but they also point to debates
over the political itself.
Four decades before the Anthropocene entered academic discourse, Hannah Arendt
made a provocative inquiry into the scientific and political implications of human impacts
on the Earth. In this article, we argue that Arendt’s account provides critical resources for
engaging debates over ‘the political’ in the Anthropocene. The political is not, of course, a
neutral ground where differing views jostle for influence. Rather, it is shaped by contests
over who and what participates and matters in politics itself (Machin, 2019; Mann and
Wainwright, 2018). Our entry point is Arendt’s (1958a) volume The Human Condition,
which is often read, correctly, as a meditation on the conditions of possibility for political
action as a vitalizing practice set amid her concerns over the alienating experience of ‘the
social’ (Canovan, 1994; Dikec¸, 2013; Owens, 2012; Pitken, 1998). What has often passed
unnoticed about the book, however, is that Arendt (1958a: 3) foregrounds humans as fun-
damentally ‘earth-bound creatures’. As we argue, an overarching theme of The Human
Condition is to draw out the implications of being earthbound in light of capitalism,
modern science and technology (particularly nuclear technologies). As we show, Arendt’s
analysis of the entanglements among science and politics in the modern world bears directly
on debates over the political in the Anthropocene. More than this, it is pertinent to contests
over ‘being earthbound’ within it (Danowski and Viveiros de Castro, 2017; Latour, 2017,
2018).
This article has five sections. ‘Anthropocene conditions and the political’ situates
Arendt’s argument in The Human Condition within her oeuvre and amid contemporary
debates over the Anthropocene. According to Arendt (1958a), a novel feature of the
‘modern world’ is the human capacity to not merely of act upon nature, but act into it.
‘We have begun’, Arendt (2006: 58) wrote, ‘to act into nature as we used to act into history’.
Such turns of phrase are not cherry-picked quotes. Rather, they characterize the ethos of
The Human Condition and Arendt’s later writings in ways that provide a rejoinder to critics
who dismiss Arendt as anthropo- or socio-centric (e.g. Connolly, 2017; see below). They also
provide resources for generative engagements with how Arendt reworked the boundaries
distinguishing the fundamental activities of labour, work and action – the triad anchoring
what she calls the vita activa. This triad of activities comprising the vita activa corresponds
to the human condition across the domains of life (labour), worldliness (work) and politics
(action). Furthermore, Arendt’s insights on humans acting into nature anticipated a now
familiar axiom of the Anthropocene: that human and geological times intersect
(Chakrabarty, 2009).So situated, Arendt’s (1958a) diagnosis of the ‘transformation of man-
kind’ is linked to the transformations wrought by acting into nature under the dual pressures
of capitalism and technoscience. Together, these alter the terrain of the political by trans-
forming what it means to be earth-bound creatures.
2 EPD: Society and Space 0(0)
‘A political ontology of process’ and ‘Earth alienation’ examine, respectively, how
Arendt (1958a, 2005) developed two senses of ‘being earthbound’ that make the political
coordinate to capacities of acting into nature. The first sense of ‘being earthbound’ is
marked by an ontological shift away from phenomenological accounts referenced to
‘being’ – in which nature and things are treated as an ontic realm separate from action –
to a political ontology of process. Here, Arendt asks how politics are altered by the capacity
to channel forces happening only elsewhere in the universe, like nuclear fusion, into earthly
processes. For Arendt, understanding the political ontology of process requires tracking the
transformations that enable action into nature across collisions of capital, science and tech-
nology. The second sense of ‘being earthbound’ is referenced to scientific praxis and, more
specifically, to what Arendt identifies as ‘earth alienation’. In contrast to (but not in conflict
with) Marxist accounts of the alienation of labour, Arendt identifies how the disclosure of
the Earth through the multiplicity of scientific praxis created new conditions of political
alienation. No longer is politics anchored by common sense experience and the plurality of
ways individuals encounter reality, for the experiential disclosure of the social and natural
world is always already mediated by technoscience. These two senses of being earthbound
led Arendt (1963a: 527) to renounce not only anthropocentrism but, more radically, ‘all
anthropomorphic elements and principles, as they arise either from the world given to the
five human senses or from categories inherent in the human mind’. This form of non-anthro-
pocentrism poses acute difficulties for the political, because the plural perspectives through
which the reality of the social world is understood must all travel in single file: through
forms of science and technology that disclose the world through instruments and techniques
that bring universal processes into earthly affairs.
Finally, ‘Being earthbound in the Anthropocene’ returns to intersections of science, pol-
itics and the geopolitical concerns of the Anthropocene (e.g. Belcher et al., 2020; Clark and
Yusoff, 2017; Dalby, 2020; Johnson et al., 2014). There, we heed Honig’s (1993: 121) admo-
nition that, while not everything is political for Arendt, nothing is ‘ontologically protected’
in the transformation of the human condition she examined. In this spirit, we contrast
Arendt’s notions of being earthbound against proposals by Latour and Lenton (2019; cf.
Lenton and Latour 2018), who mobilize Gaia to ground political freedom. Latour and
Lenton (2019) reject the form of Earth system science (ESS) that made possible the expla-
nation of Anthropocene (cf. Schellnhuber, 1999; Steffen et al., 2004). For Latour (2018: 59),
the force of Gaia reorients planetary politics such that it ‘hardly matters’ whether industri-
alism or colonialism were good or bad. By contrast, Arendt suggests a route that stays with
both the science and the intersecting, alienating violences of industrialism, colonialism, and
capital. In Arendt’s account, modern sciences are constitutive of the political. Likewise, we
argue, ESS cannot be set aside in accounts of the political any more than industrialism or
colonialism can be waved off in votes connecting sign and function to mark the
Anthropocene.
Anthropocene conditions and the political
Writing of the political challenge of the Anthropocene, Clark (2014: 28) argues that the
magnitude of forces at work transforming the Earth system have the ‘capacity to undo the
political’ owing to their potential to annihilate ‘political beings themselves’. Clark, citing
Honig (2009: 28), restates the challenge as a matter of synchronizing contemporary politics
with inherited political and geological histories. Likewise, Chakrabarty (2016) worries inher-
ited political terms once anchored within the human/nature dualism, such as liberal free-
dom, turn out to be fables when that dualism collapses in the Anthropocene. In her own
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manner, Arendt (2005: 145) foresaw the depth of the challenge of the planet altering forces
of capitalism, science and technology when she wrote that
there is hardly a single political category or a single political concept that has been passed down
to us that, when measured against the [possibility of the atomic end to all organic life], does not
prove theoretically obsolete and practically inapplicable.
Even though Arendt shared many of the sentiments of her post-WWII contemporaries, who
expressed anxieties over the effect of science and technology on planetary and human affairs
(Greif, 2015), she nevertheless formulated a distinctive take on the political that did not
reject the scientific ethos, which opened room for new political categories and concepts
attuned to a scientifically-informed ‘being earthbound’. That is, Arendt considered science
politically, as a domain of human action, while remaining alert to its tendency towards the
‘technical colonization of society’ (Lazier, 2011: 604).
Arendt wrote The Human Condition as preparations were under way for the International
Geophysical Year (1957–1958), and she opened the book ‘with a critique of Sputnik, the
best-known IGY project’ (Goossen, 2020: 157). Throughout the 1950s, ‘big science’ took
shape through geophysical techniques that termed what we now call ‘anthropogenic’ forces
as ‘artificial’ phenomena, such as the ‘artificial radiation’ of atomic bombs, the ‘artificial
burning’ that pumped CO2 into the atmosphere, and Sputnik, the ‘artificial satellite’ in
Earth’s orbit (Goossen, 2020). To get political traction on how ‘artificial’ phenomena simul-
taneously transformed nature and the human condition, Arendt distinguished the modern
age from the modern world. Arendt wrote (1958a: 6),
[T]he modern age is not the same as the modern world. Scientifically, the modern age which
began in the seventeenth century came to an end at the beginning of the twentieth century;
politically, the modern world, in which we live today, was born with the first atomic explosions.
Arendt was no stranger to bold theses, yet references in The Human Condition to how the
modern world arose at the intersection of human artifice that transformed nature by acting
into it have not been as thoroughly engaged as her more well-known diagnoses; e.g. how
totalitarian violence produced statelessness in ways that revealed ‘the right to have rights’,
or how modern notions of political revolutions were distinct by virtue of instantiating new
social orders rather than restoring old ones (Arendt, 1958b, 1963b, 1972, 1994). These and
other arguments by Arendt have proved generative for scholarship on feminism, post-
colonialism, race, and the relationship between democracy and emergency (Benhabib,
1993; Canovan, 1994; Chakrabarty, 2012; Honig, 2009; Wolfe, 2002). Given the AWG’s
preference for the ‘artificial radioisotope’ signal to mark the new epoch, and its implications
for the political, The Human Condition stands amidst Arendt’s broader oeuvre as an
untapped resource for understanding the political as shaped by ‘artificial’ (i.e. anthropo-
genic) forces that act into nature.
The political stakes of crossing from what Arendt called the ‘modern age’ to the ‘modern
world’ revolve on the politics of ‘worldliness’ itself. We argue that Anthropocene scholar-
ship can think productively with Arendt with regard to worldly, ‘political matter’, and the
role of non-human things affecting the political (cf. Braun and Whatmore, 2010). Honig
(2017), for instance, reinvigorates the centrality of ‘things’ in Arendt’s account of the
modern world. It is a well-known aspect of Arendt’s (1958a: 52) thought that ‘to live
together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have
it in common, as the table is located between those who sit around it’. For Arendt, things
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provide permanence to the social world. By rethinking the function of things, Honig (2017:
34) makes the case that Arendt is a kind of ‘object-relations theorist’ who recognized the
capacity of ‘things’ to stabilize the world. The troubling corollary, however, is that the novel
capacity of atomic weapons meant some ‘things’ could destabilize – that is, end – the
conditions by which any world is made permanent. Honig’s argument for the centrality
of ‘things’ contrasts with Last’s (2017: 74) view that Arendt tolerates things, but generally
‘has a very negative attitude towards the encroachment of matter on human affairs’. There
are reasons to follow Honig in this instance. First, as Hyv€onen (2016: 545, original empha-
sis) shows, Arendt’s concern was with how the ‘thingly character of the world’ was under
threat by accelerating material forces of science, technology and capital. Second, as Schmidt
(2017) shows, Arendt’s attention to things offers a way to arrest the ‘naturalization of
process’ in which non-human agency, such as that of water, has been manipulated to link
geology and liberal governmentality in the Anthropocene. As discussed below, Arendt
placed particular emphasis on how the materiality of the world is transformed by capitalist
processes and, with it, the terms of political governance.
Honig’s call to recognize the constitutive role of ‘things’ contrasts with political theorists
who dismiss Arendt as irrelevant to understanding the political entanglements between
human and non-human action. Bennett (2010: 34) criticizes Arendt for positioning
humans as the ‘bearer of an exceptional kind of power’ that excludes non-human actions
and their political implications. Connolly (2017) groups Arendt with other ‘sociocentric’
thinkers who disregard the intrusions of non-human processes and forces within and beyond
human worlds. There are important rejoinders to these critiques. Principal among them is
that process, the register Bennett and Connolly respectively mobilize, is what they overlook
in Arendt, who employed process to connect Earth and human histories with scientific
explanations of earthbound conditions. For Bennett (2010: 33), explaining emergent cau-
sality demands treating ‘process as itself an actant’. For Connolly (2017), process is central
to accounts of emergence. Arendt (1958a: 296) was alert to the importance of process and
honed her arguments in view of the ontological questions at stake when, ‘In place of the
concept of Being we now find the concept of Process’. Indeed, Arendt (1958a: 232) under-
stands human action as process:
The central concept of the two entirely new sciences of the modern age, natural science no less
than historical, is the concept of process, and the actual human experience underlying it is
action. Only because we are capable of acting, of starting processes of our own, can we conceive
of both nature and history as systems of processes.
An adequate appraisal of Arendt requires engaging her account of process, an ontology no
more natural than those of ‘being’ it displaced.
Arendt’s account of ‘the’ modern world is also salient to work on regarding multiple
worlds in the Anthropocene (de la Cadena and Blaser, 2018). Although Parr (2018) and
Yeatman (2015), respectively, find resources in Arendt’s account of action for confronting
the depoliticization of the Anthropocene, it is necessary to further examine her account. For
instance, Arendt’s connection of the exceptional force of atomic weaponry, and the conflu-
ence of capitalism and technoscience that makes it possible to act into nature, speak directly
to Anthropocene scholarship rethinking politics across geological, political, social, non-
human and planetary life (Clark and Yusoff, 2017; Dalby, 2020; Latour, 2017;
Swyngedouw and Ernstson 2018). Especially important is what Skrimshire (2019: 72)
described as Arendt’s insight that changing relationships to things entailed that ‘modernity
became a vision of the human as earthbound in its own world’. This internally facing gaze
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presents a familiar normative concern: that interpretations of the Anthropocene take actions
by one set of social actors as overdetermining all other forms of social or political life
(Schmidt, 2019). This is not quite Arendt’s target; hers is about the impossibility of anchor-
ing the political in the permanence of the world owing to things (e.g. atomic weapons)
capable of rendering it impermanent. This does not displace concern with the violence of
industrialism, colonialism or capitalism. Rather, it adds to them by entangling science with
the political, from extraction and trade of the raw materials for nuclear technologies
through to their use in the co-production of climate science (Edwards, 2012; Hecht,
2012). Indeed, Arendt argued that technoscience did not make a new ‘nature’ but rather
exhibited capacity for ‘starting natural processes which would not have come about without
human interference’ (Arendt, 2006: 58). For Arendt, the open-ended, irreversible aspects of
these new processes rendered scientific action both like and unlike political action generally.
Like action, atomic science and technology created ‘an endless chain of happenings whose
eventual outcome the actor is utterly incapable of knowing or controlling beforehand’
(Arendt, 2006: 58). Unlike action as previously understood, science disclosed forces that
could undo the political in ways that affected the condition of being earthbound.
A political ontology of process
‘Process’ is ubiquitous across efforts to preclude dualisms parsing humans from non-
humans in the Anthropocene (Chakrabarty, 2014; Clark and Yusoff, 2017; Haraway,
2016; Moore, 2015). Yet, the politics of process are often left unaddressed. Even in works
that nod to Arendt (e.g. Swyngedouw and Ernstson, 2018), process figures as a site of
conceptual and material alignments rather than a political register. Here we consider
Arendt’s political ontology of process. Arendt drew explicitly on Whitehead’s (1957: 53)
claim that ‘nature is a process’ to situate human time with respect to the non-human, or
what Whitehead termed the ‘passage of nature’. In this regard, Arendt had two aims that cut
across this section: (1) to give an account of how the natural sciences internalize the notion
of process as they take on historical valence, and (2) to identify how the ontology of process
must be understood as no more natural than the fixed ontology of ‘being’ it displaces. At
this intersection, Arendt (1958a: 6) confronts the end of the modern age – the end of the
nature/society dualism that took root with the rise of natural sciences in the 17th century –
and contrasts it to the modern world ‘born with the first atomic explosions’.
Arendt (1958a) developed her view by drawing on Whitehead’s break with analytic phi-
losophy and his embrace of process. This proved instructive in two respects. First, it sig-
nalled that
objects of knowledge can no longer be things or eternal motions but must be processes . . . the
object of science therefore is no longer nature or the universe but the history, the story of coming
into being, of nature or life or the universe. (Arendt, 1958a: 296)
This shift in understanding from a static and formal natural order of being to processes of
becoming was anticipated, in Arendt’s view, by 19th century turns to history across numer-
ous sciences, such as geology, biology and anthropology. Following Whitehead, Arendt
(1958b: 137) argued that the essential feature of process as the basis of reality is that it
‘has no end or aim but itself’. Second, since ‘being’ was no longer the stable ‘in-itself’ of an
object that remained separate from its phenomenal appearance, practices of scientific exper-
imentation premised on that form of ontological stability required revision. The nature of
things qua process now ‘derived their significance and meaning solely from their functions in
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the over-all process’ (Arendt, 1958a: 296). In other words, science discloses ‘happenings’ in
processual time rather than revealing (stable) being. Arendt (1958a, 2005) refers to this
overall process as the ‘web of relationships’ entangling society and nature.
In the modern world, process encompassed the overall conditions of possibility for under-
standing natural and social realms. Arendt argued that process took hold as the key political
register as the modern age gave way to the modern world because the latter’s processual and
accelerating permutations (i.e. productivity, growth, development) undermined a sense of
permanence in the world. For instance, Arendt (1958a: 105) identified the ‘hitherto unheard-
of process of growing property, [and] growing acquisition’ that had become an object of
inquiry for 17th-century political theorists, particularly Hobbes. It was in that historical
moment, Arendt (1958a: 105) argued, when the ‘crudest superstition of the modern age –
that “money begets money” – as well its sharpest political insight – that power begets power’
that the concept of process emerged as the key register of the modern age.2
This historical juncture prompted Arendt to articulate a political ontology of process by
mobilizing her distinctions among labour, work and action to consider how accumulative
processes ultimately undermined the permanence of the modern age – the presumption that
accumulative processes would expand endlessly. Arendt’s starting point is to treat labour as
constrained to biological activities of subsistence, reproduction and survival. Labouring
activities are those that result in no permanent changes to Earth processes; a field left
uncultivated will eventually re-wild according to independent processes of nature, to use
one of her examples. This is not the same as claiming that, left untended, fields return to an
original state. Nature for Arendt is process, not being. From Arendt’s (1958a: 150) stand-
point, nature cannot ‘make’ things that outlast itself precisely because everything in nature is
‘self-identical with the process through which it comes into being’.
In contrast to labour, work is the fabrication of artefacts (including the built environ-
ment) made by humans. Arendt’s view of the working subject, homo faber, is used by
Szerszynski (2012) to consolidate her contribution to the Anthropocene, but this view
proves too constraining as we show. For Arendt, work produces objects that, by virtue of
their permanency, constitute the world by functioning as common furniture – things – for
human experience and meaning (Oliver, 2015). Arendt refers to this common world as the
‘human artifice’. In the modern age, the (biological) labour of the human organism was
reincorporated into natural processes, while the world corresponded to the durable works of
homo faber. Here Arendt (1958a: 137) draws on Heidegger (1971) to argue that the world
has no ‘sublime indifference of an untouched nature’ but is instead made through the
‘environment of nature’. Arendt (1958a: 148) described the activity of work as one that
‘denaturalized nature for our own worldly ends’. That is, homo faber conceives of ends to
pursue and denaturalizes nature by making a permanent environment for the social world:
wood into tables, stones into cities, petrochemicals into plastics, and so forth. For Arendt,
however, the durability of the world underwent immense transformations over the longue
duree of the modern age and was undercut entirely with the onset of the modern world.
Arendt assembles her account of the transformations entailed by the modern world in
ways too numerous to rehearse here. What interests us is how and why homo faber was
viewed unfit for navigating the political in the modern world. Arendt’s account begins in
terms congruent with Marx, identifying how the expropriation of peasants from the land, in
Europe and the colonies, was a precondition for labour power under capitalism, and sub-
sequently for the form of alienation induced by ‘naked exposure to the exigencies of life’ of
those working in mines and factories (Arendt, 1958a: 255). The outcome of colonialism and
industrial capitalism, however, was not a durable world produced by homo faber. Rather,
Arendt (2005: 157) pointed to the emergence of a consumer waste economy which
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accelerated as it matured through the ‘rape of nature’. Under a capitalist mode of produc-
tion, the activity of homo faber was no longer confined to making a permanent world of
durable objects akin to the pre-capitalist artisan. Rather, accumulation accelerates such that
the productive activity of homo faber is fed back into the process of wealth accumulation
itself. The emergence of labouring classes and consumer society rely on the powerful activ-
ity, articulated by Marx, of metabolizing the raw materials of nature and bodily capacity
into social (re)production. For Arendt, understanding of the political ontology of process is
central to positioning the destabilizing collision of capital, industrialism and technology
with transformations to the human condition. Despite her agreement with Marx, she dis-
tinguished her view from Marx’s (1973: 542) materialist notion that ‘man’s’ goal is one of
grasping ‘his own history as a process and the recognition of nature . . . as his real body;’ by
which Marx meant the transformative metabolization of nature through its relationship
with human labour (Foster et al., 2010). For Arendt, rather than a ‘recognition of
nature’, something novel had been introduced by the human capacity to act into nature,
and to bring about an intersection of historical and life processes. She drew attention to how
the transformation of social reproduction under capitalism undermined the permanency of
the social structures through which society metabolized nature:
Only when wealth became capital, whose chief function was to generate more capital, did private
property equal or come close to the permanence inherent in the commonly shared world.
However, this permanence is of a different nature; it is the permanence of a process rather
than the permanence of a stable structure (Arendt, 1958a: 68–69).
She goes on to describe how the tools used to ‘denaturalize nature’ in the creation of the
human environment reached their outer limit when they began to channel the natural forces
‘into the human world’ in a way that ‘shatter[s] the very purposefulness of the world’:
Today we have begun to ‘create’, as it were, that is, to unchain natural processes of our own
which would have never happened without us, and instead of carefully surrounding the human
artifice for defences against nature’s elementary forces, keeping them as far as possible outside
the man-made world, we have channelled these forces, along with their elementary power, into
the world itself. The result is a veritable revolution in the concept of fabrication; manufactur-
ing . . .has become a ‘continuous process’, the process of the conveyor belt and assembly
line . . .For a society of labourers, the world of machines has become a substitute for the real
world, even though this pseudo world cannot fulfil the most important task of the human
artifice, which is to offer mortals a dwelling place more permanent and stable than themselves.
(Arendt, 1958a: 150)
To grapple with human capacities that undercut the permanency of the Earth and of the
‘world’ presumed upon in the modern age, Arendt mobilized action as a field of possibility in
which the political may be reconfigured with respect to novelty and process. Influenced by
Whitehead and Nietzsche, Arendt positioned her theory of action in reference to process
(Villa, 1992). Arendt, however, did not draw an isomorphism between natural and social
processes – between ‘man’ and species-being – as did Marx. Rather, Arendt’s (1958a: 7) view
was pluralistic, grounded in her claim that ‘men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the
world’. The plurality of action distinguishes it from labour and work in critical ways.
Notably, there is no ideal form of action, as may be the case in the designs of homo faber
according to which a house is made. Whereas work has a beginning and an end, action has
beginnings and only unpredictable ends, owing to the introduction of something which has
8 EPD: Society and Space 0(0)
consequences that cannot fully be anticipated. Action is a process. It takes place in ‘webs of
relationships’ through which individuals disclose themselves to one another in speech and
deed (Arendt, 1958a: 183). Action is also irreversible, owing to the impossibility of control-
ling the effects of an act once initiated into a web of relationships. The ‘consequences [of
action] are boundless, because action, though it may proceed from nowhere, so to speak,
acts into a medium where every reaction becomes a chain reaction and where every process
is the cause of new processes’ (Arendt, 1958a: 190).
Arendt’s political ontology of process anticipates Anthropocene concerns about the ‘end
of the world’ and of technocratic dreams where humans (qua homo faber) remake the world
(Danowski and Viveiros de Castro, 2017). According to Arendt, homo faber’s formula for
maintaining the ‘world’ against the elements that break it down is insufficient. Rather,
Arendt (1958a: 231) held that the political ontology of process rendered traditional political
and philosophical accounts of the world inadequate in view of scientific and technological
advances that both disclosed new realities and introduced new processes that affected the
formerly stable structures of political life. Thus, the novelty of the modern world was not
merely a rearrangement or new ‘making’ of things. It was the introduction of novel pro-
cesses into both Earth and world: a merger of world and process at the expense of
permanence.
The end of the world, in Arendt’s (2005) view, is marked by the loss of capacity for
action, not the end of ‘nature’ that coincides with the end of the modern age. Arendt’s
political ontology of process provided a position in which one novel political outcome of
scientific action arose as universal processes from outside the earth were channelled into
earthly and human affairs. In that moment, the modern age gave way to the modern world;
a phenomenon clearly, but not uniquely, on display in the case of atomic power. The
exchange of fixed or transcendental categories for those of process meant that sciences
premised on the latter also had the potential to undercut the stability of a world of unal-
terable ‘things’ produced by homo faber. That is, modern science and technology could alter
processes themselves. This was profoundly alienating in Arendt’s view. ‘Only we’, Arendt
wrote (1958a: 268),
and we only for hardly more than a few decades, have come to live in a world thoroughly
determined by a science and a technology whose objective truth and practical know-how are
derived from cosmic and universal, as distinguished from terrestrial and “natural,” laws, and
which is a knowledge acquired by selecting a point of reference outside the earth is applied to
earthly nature and the human artifice.
Moreover, without recourse to metaphysics – to being – the politics of disclosing the human
condition in the modern world required a disposition towards the political capacious
enough to address technologies that changed the condition of being earthbound.
Earth alienation
For Arendt, scientific practice qua action upended the modern age, which gets to the core
project of The Human Condition regarding how the vita activa can no longer be understood
through received paradigms of political possibility. Our argument is that necessary to, but
often underemphasized in treatments of Arendt, is a second sense of being earthbound. This
sense is oriented to scientific and technological praxis. The novelty of Arendt’s final chapters
in The Human Condition on ‘Action’ and ‘The Vita Activa in the Modern Age’ is how
scientific and technological endeavours inaugurate the modern world and, in turn, affect
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the conditions of political action. Here, Arendt’s commitment to action reveals a double
bind. On the one hand, the novel capacity for action in the modern world is the capacity to
channel universal forces into the deep rhythms of Earthly processes and human affairs in
irreversible and unpredictable ways. On the other hand, action is needed in the form of a
remedy that avoids yet further violence entailed by homo faber’s practices of making. As
Arendt (1958a: 238) put it:
Modern natural science and technology, which no longer observe or take material from or
imitate the processes of nature but seem actually to act into it, seem, by the same token, to
have carried irreversibility and human unpredictability into the natural realm, where no remedy
can be found to undo what has been done . . . [I]t seems that one of the great dangers of acting in
the mode of making and within its categorical framework of means and ends lies in the con-
comitant self-deprivation of the remedies inherent only in action, so that one is bound not only
to do with the means of violence necessary for all forms of fabrication, but also to undo what he
has done as he undoes an unsuccessful object, by means of destruction. Nothing appears more
manifest in these attempts than the greatness of human power, whose source lies in the ability to
act, and without which action’s inherent remedies inevitably begins to overpower and destroy
not man himself but the conditions under which life was given to him.
In this passage, Arendt anticipates a pressing concern in the Anthropocene: the setting of
political possibility between more violently ‘making’ an environment suitable for humans –
denaturalizing nature further such as through geo-engineering – versus identifying an off-
ramp to logics of domination (L€ovbrand et al., 2010). For Arendt, homo faber can only
orient the novelty of the modern world towards control over processes. However, if the
political is to be configured not only with respect to processes but also to the conditions for
affecting life/non-life now evident in capacity for nuclear annihilation, Arendt argues
(1958a: 181), then human plurality within the ‘web of relationships’ through which the
common world is disclosed must be oriented to action. The path to this conclusion, how-
ever, is not initially heartening. It requires examining Arendt’s notion of ‘earth alienation’,
in which the very sciences and technologies that destabilized the modern age are those that
disclose the modern world.
Arendt approached alienation in ways shared with other scholars who worried about the
effects of scientific and instrumental rationality on politics. What distinguished Arendt is
that she demanded science be configured within the political. In this regard, Arendt offers an
account of science as action, not science in action (cf. Latour, 1987). Central to her account
was how the Archimedean view developed by modern science displaced geocentric concep-
tions of the earth into a universal context. This form of universality was not an abstract view
from nowhere; the Archimedean view should not be confused with Haraway’s (1988) now
famous god-trick. Rather, the Archimedean view was entangled with technologies that
displaced the meaning of being earthbound by creating the novel possibility of disclosing
Earthly processes from a perspective of the universe – i.e. planetary sciences, the techno-
logical view of Earth from space – in ways previously unavailable to human experience.
Arendt (1958a) begins with Galileo’s telescope. This technology started to undo the
cosmology built between Earth and Sky that governed the western imagination from antiq-
uity to the Renaissance by creating the possibility for a universal science governed by
astrophysical laws not originating on Earth. In this sense, the transition from a geocentric
to a heliocentric universe presaged a broader form of earth alienation that undercut the
embodied sense-experience through which scientific objects were known, such as direct
observation or measurement in a laboratory (Arendt, 2006). Instead of the basis for
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common sense that developed through the plural perspectives and shared first-person obser-
vations of subjects and objects, it was scientific instruments, technologies and abstract
mathematical formulas which now provided means of disclosing things and processes that
markedly changed the understanding of ‘reality’ (Daston and Galison, 2007; Jasanoff,
2010).
Arendt (1958a: 262) argued that as instrumental sophistication advanced in physics and
mathematics – from atomic acceleration to fantastically more powerful telescopes and the
production of new elements – a new form of alienation arose. This form of earth alienation
makes the ‘discovery of the globe as a whole and the world alienation produced in the
twofold process of expropriation and wealth accumulation . . . of minor significance’
(Arendt, 1958a: 263). Arendt’s style of drawing together insights from thermodynamics
and quantum theory may be critiqued for accuracy and historical positioning. But those
errors do not undermine her central political insight: that the form of ‘universal science’
bringing cosmic processes to Earth had novel, transformative effects on the human condi-
tion. The consequence of earth alienation was that science – especially nuclear sciences and
modern physics – had introduced the possibility that the permanence of the earth was no
longer guaranteed. And yet, paradoxically, the only way to understand this transformation
was through those same sciences. The upshot, for Arendt, was that these sciences became
constitutive of politics in the modern world – a novel, if alienating aspect of the political.
Our goal is not to provide an account of Arendt’s philosophy of science (cf. Yaqoob,
2014). Rather, we aim to understand how Arendt treated scientific practice as a novel form
of action. When the loss of a common world is coincident with the channelling of universal
processes into nature, the effect is a form of earth alienation in which being earthbound is, in
practice, no longer constituted through common experience but instead disclosed through
sciences and technologies that demand non-anthropocentrism in order to apprehend the role
of the universal within the political (Arendt, 1963a).For Arendt, earth alienation required a
political response for which homo faber was ill equipped. The mismatch arose at the dis-
tinction between science as making versus science as action. For instance, writing on phys-
icists involved in the development of nuclear technology, Arendt did not hold in reserve her
compunctions about how poorly the political figured in science as making. Rather, the
penultimate paragraph of The Human Condition holds that scientists have retained the
capacity for action because they retain the possibility for bringing novelty into the
modern world (1958a: 324). Their practices, however, are directed not to the ‘web of rela-
tionships’ but towards acting into nature through making:
The simple fact that physicists split the atom without any hesitations the very moment they knew
how to do it, although they realized full well the enormous destructive potentialities of their
operation, demonstrates that the scientist qua scientist does not even care about the survival of
the human race on earth, or, for that matter, with the survival of the planet itself. (Arendt,
1963a: 536)
The universal perspective created through scientific action transformed what it meant to be
earthbound. The atomic detonations of WWII bore shocking witness to this. Advances in
modern science, however, have only amplified these challenges through advances in syn-
thetic biology and nanotechnology (Preston, 2018). As Carruth and Marzec (2014) argue,
the technologies through which the Earth system is disclosed, such as remote sensing, have
stark aesthetic and ethical implications. For instance, reliance on technological instruments
may undermine possibilities for the collective witnessing of events from plural perspectives,
which Arendt (1982) argued was key to the sensus communis of political judgement. Arendt
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held that this condition required acknowledging a new form of ‘earth alienation’ as ‘the very
quintessence of the human condition’ (Arendt, 1958a: 2). As she stated:
But today we may almost say that we have demonstrated even scientifically that, though we live
now, and probably always will, under the earth’s conditions, we are not mere earth-bound
creatures. Modern science owes its great triumphs to having looked upon and treated earth-
bound nature from a truly universal viewpoint, that is, from an Archimedean standpoint taken,
wilfully and explicitly, outside the earth. (Arendt, 1958a: 11)
Despite Arendt’s indictments of science as making, she does not reject what science disclo-
ses. Viewed in this way, The Human Condition can be read as taking stock of modern science
(Hirsch, 2020); not a rejection of science, but an examination of compounding strains of
earth alienation on the political. Understanding how modern science and technology entrain
earth alienation within scientific practices of disclosing reality is central to Arendt’s project.
Science as action views displacement of ‘the human’ for a non-anthropocentric capacity to
take up an Archimedean view not in abstraction but through technologies which create new
experiences in being earthbound. To ‘see’ Earth from outer space without ever leaving the
planet, for instance, fundamentally alters the collective account of reality in ways no longer
anchored in the world of common, sense-experience of merely anthropocentric agents.
While science, technology and mathematical thinking are not the only ways to disclose
‘reality’, they enter the ranks of speech and deed as privileged modes of inquiry even as
they add constraints to the plural condition of being earthbound in an impermanent world.
Being earthbound in the Anthropocene
When Robert Oppenheimer witnessed the first atomic detonation, he uttered words from the
Bhagavad-Gita: ‘Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds’. It was his own trans-
lation. As Oppenheimer’s biographer notes, the passage is usually translated: ‘I am all
powerful Time; which destroys all things’ (Monk, 2012). The latter is germane to
Arendt’s (2005: 145) diagnosis of the modern world as a time in which former political
categories and concepts prove ‘theoretically obsolete and practically inapplicable’ owing to
things of such power that they can annihilate the political. Arendt’s response was to rethink
earthbound conditions ontologically, and in scientific praxis, when the political was no
longer only earthbound. By the end of The Human Condition, Arendt reaches the conclusion
that science must be treated as action – a constituent aspect of the political. Yet science was
not totalizing. Arendt refused to treat science as making. Logically, she could not, because
‘things’ science made were no longer a guarantee of permanence, and this fact, as we argued
above, marked the arrival of the modern world. Instead, Arendt’s (1958a: 7) diagnosis of
science as action required a treatment of the implications for plurality; ‘to the fact that men,
not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world’. In this conclusion, to distinguish further
how Arendt’s problematic differs from, and contributes to, Anthropocene scholarship, we
contrast it with Bruno Latour’s widely circulating account of being earthbound.
Latour’s account of being earthbound in the Anthropocene recuperates Schmitt’s (2007)
notion of ‘the political’ to distinguish friends from enemies, and to mark the sovereign
power of exception regarding life and death. For Latour (2017), Schmitt’s distillation of
the political as ‘friends versus enemies’ parallels a distinction between ‘the moderns’ (those
living by the society/nature divide) versus those who are ‘earthbound’ in the Anthropocene.
These enemies now compete for space, territory and soil in which it ‘hardly matters’ whether
industrialism or colonialism were good or bad, because planetary politics are now being
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reoriented in an epoch where the Earth itself – Gaia – is a political agent (Latour, 2018: 59).
The spatial implication, for Latour, is the reorientation of the political through Gaia as a
distributed form of sovereign agency over the conditions of life. To be earthbound, on
Latour’s view, is to accept Gaia’s conditions without, as do moderns, forcing them to
comport with the society/nature dualism. Ultimately, however, this leads Latour to reject
ESS. The problem with the treatment of Earth as a single, integrated system, according to
Latour and Lenton (2019: 676), is that Gaia is not a system whose sum is greater than the
parts. Seeking to avoid Haraway’s ‘god-trick’ – the view from nowhere – Latour and Lenton
(2019: 676, original emphasis) argue that global views of Earth ‘should be resisted because
nobody who claims to have “a global view” actually resides in any real space’. In their view,
Gaia reigns supreme as a distributed sovereign in which ‘life forms literally make their own
laws’ not on a globe, but in ‘a thin biofilm, a surface’ comprising a few kilometres of
atmosphere and not ‘very far down in the deep earth below’ (Latour and Lenton, 2019:
676, original emphasis).
The contrast of Latour’s (and Lenton’s) views with Arendt, and with positions that stay
with ESS, is immediately evident. First, there is a difference. Namely, Arendt recognizes that
the laws governing life on Earth are not particular to it; Gaia is not free of the first and
second laws of thermodynamics. Second, Arendt’s account of how the universal enters
politics operates in real space: at the sites where capitalism, technology and science intersect.
Her view of science as action contrasts with Latour’s well-known view of science in action,
where uncovering homo faber’s purported views from nowhere anchors the task of ‘making
things public’ (Latour and Weibel, 2005). Third, Latour and Arendt both look to human
transformations of Earth to diagnose transformations to the political. Despite this similar
orientation, they again diverge. Latour (2018) attempts to update Schmitt’s (2007) view that
the nomos of the Earth is grounded in soil by rescaling such laws to Gaia. By contrast,
Arendt rejected Schmitt’s anchoring of nomos in the earth. Indeed, her own reading of
Schmitt critiqued his view for locating the source of law in soil, and not in the relations
among persons or their rights (Jurkevics, 2017). Latour repeats Schmitt’s error when he
replaces ‘soil’ with ‘Gaia’ in ways that ignore or downplay the violence of European con-
quest, and the fact that political consent did not travel with colonial expansion (cf.
Jurkevics, 2017). This leads Latour to hold the politically obtuse and morally indefensible
view that it no longer matters whether industrialism or colonialism were good or bad
(Schmidt, 2019). It also dodges a central issue of the Anthropocene, since how scientists
connect stratigraphic signs to functional changes to the Earth system is political even by
their own account (Waters et al., 2016).
Arendt’s view of science as action does not smuggle in the society/nature divide as the
problematic of the modern world. That is a distinction of the modern age; an age now past
owing to how novel technoscience acts into nature. The real space in which such action takes
place, Arendt describes as the webs of relationships that constitute earthbound conditions.
Here, the things of science matter in ways not captured fully by ideas of ‘things’ as always
and everywhere permanent. Whereas in the modern age novelty was reserved to human
speech or deeds (as in ancient Greece), Arendt (2005, 2006) holds that in the modern world
novelty also includes the acts of science and technology that introduce (novel) processes into
earthly affairs. In this way, Arendt treats science as action, as constitutive of the political.
The corollary requirement is accepting responsibility for the form of earth alienation that
attends to the scientific disclosure of the earth, and stays with that trouble. Further, Arendt
recognizes that matter matters politically as the ‘things’ that anchor the common world are
both stabilizing and destabilizing forces on it. Critically, Arendt (1958a) argues that the
Earth itself – planetary nature – cannot replace the lost objects that once provided
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permanence to the world owing to the capacity for action to render Earth itself imperma-
nent. That is, for atomic bombs to annihilate it.
In terms of practice, Arendt’s account of being earthbound leaves the hard work of
politics unfinished and open, consistent with her view of action as the capacity ‘to begin
something new and of not being able to control or even foretell its consequences’ (Arendt,
1958a: 235, 2006). This does not relieve scholars who may wish to make use of Arendt of
clarifying her relevance to the Anthropocene. For instance, although her arguments regard-
ing race and racism have been constructively engaged in settler colonial and postcolonial
contexts (Chakrabarty, 2012; Wolfe, 2002), Arendt herself does not confront the extent of
the western political tradition itself in propagating colonial violence. Here, we identify, but
do not resolve, two lines of inquiry through which Arendt’s alternate diagnosis of trans-
formations to the political prompt considerations for projects that do not abandon the
sciences disclosing human impacts on the Earth system, but which also do not constrain
politics to them.
The two lines of inquiry Arendt takes up in The Human Conditions, those of promise and
forgiveness, feature prominently in her attempt to think through being earthbound at the
intersection where humans act into nature as they do into history. Both categories are
suggestive for thinking about Anthropocene time in reference to action and responsibility
owing to Arendt’s political treatment of science as action. They are relevant to critical
engagements of geology and the Anthropocene, and the question of for whom it marks
worldly upheaval – which Ghosh (2016) argues is a bourgeois notions of stability built on
colonialism, and Davis and Todd (2017) argue may reinforce Indigenous erasure. What if
any resources are available in Arendt (2005) given the form of Eurocentrism her work so
often reflected? Here, Arendt’s critique of science as action is easier to digest than her
positive account of what to do next. Nevertheless, as with work on gender, race and post-
colonialism that has found constructive dialogue with Arendt, Anthropocene scholarship
might also, particularly through her efforts to rethink notions of forgiveness and promise.
Arendt (1958a: 236–46) sought to secularize both terms in order to find a language to
articulate the profound, planetary changes that western science had wrought from within
its own political reserve. Those resources are limited, and part of what motivated Arendt
was concern over how to orient the modern world to the irreversibility of past actions and
the unpredictability of the future.
For Arendt, forgiveness and promise are forms of political action that do not sacrifice
plurality because they require shared practices in a web of relationships. That is, one must
enter into political relationship with those from whom forgiveness is sought. There is no
singular account of what that entails because plurality cannot be given beforehand; so too
for promise. In the modern world, this register spans human and non-human processes, as
well as those of industrialism and colonialism from which earth alienation grew out of the
alienation of labour. Temporally, a secular orientation to promise contrasts with forgiveness
by being a future anterior for action that requires, by virtue of the web of relationships, a
commitment to plurality going forward. Indeed, as scholarship attentive to different notions
of ‘world’ suggests, it is critical to think about how divergent political practices are
entangled with one another (de la Cadena and Blaser, 2018). What is suggested by
Arendt (1958a) is that the modern world – impermanent and novel – necessitates forms
of anchoring common experiences that neither deny how acting into nature produces earth
alienation, nor which deny that it is only through treating science as politics that plurality in
the modern world can be maintained and, with it, the condition for freedom on an earth
transformed.
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Arendt’s account of freedom as the basis of the political is not without challenges (cf.
Moten, 2018; Shulman, 2020), but it possesses a different orientation than accounts which
collapse the political to life, one that points us towards a pluralistic account of freedom itself
– such as those articulated in different legal traditions for whom the Anthropocene is not
qualitatively new but an intensification of on-going violence (Whyte, 2017). Here we return
to the crux of our main argument regarding why Arendt is relevant to the Anthropocene: to
treat declarations of the Anthropocene politically requires staying with the science as a
constitutive, unavoidable and alienating aspect of earthbound freedom.
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Notes
1. The vote was recorded on the AWG website: http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/working-groups/
anthropocene/. Last accessed 11 July 2020.
2. Arendt (1958b: 143) credits Hobbes with inaugurating a political ontology in which the ‘process of
never-ending accumulation of power ’ provides the condition of possibility to expand sovereign
authority. With Hobbes, process was naturalized to notions of growth, wealth and the development
of security for the life of the individual and the state: ’Hobbes’s insistence on power as the motor
of all things human divine . . . sprang from the theoretically indisputable proposition that a never-
ending accumulation of property must be based on a never-ending accumulation of power . . .The
limitless process of capital accumulation needs the political structure of so “unlimited a Power” that
it can protect growing property by constantly growing more powerful’ (Arendt, 1958b: 143).
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